, Hash, and n. Master Secret (z_T) - The Master Secret z_T is the master key generated and privately kept by KMS_T and is used by KMS_T to generate the private keys of the users that it provisions; it is an integer in the range 2 to q-1. KMS Public Key: Z_T = [z_T]P - The KMS Public Key Z_T is used to form Public Key Establishment Keys for all users provisioned by KMS_T; it is a point of order q in E(F_p). It MUST be provisioned by KMS_T to all who are authorized to send messages to users of the IBE system. Groves Informational [Page 5] RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012 Receiver Secret Key (RSK) - Each user enrolled in an IBE system is provisioned with a Receiver Secret Key by its KMS. The RSK provided to a user with Identifier 'a' by KMS_T is denoted K_(a,T). In SAKKE, the RSK is a point of order q in E(F_p). Shared Secret Value (SSV) - The aim of the SAKKE scheme is for the Sender to securely transmit a shared secret value to the Receiver. The SSV is an integer in the range 0 to (2^n) - 1. Encapsulated Data - The Encapsulated Data are used to transmit secret information securely to the Receiver. They can be computed directly from the Receiver's Identifier, the public parameters, the KMS Public Key, and the SSV to be transmitted. In SAKKE, the Encapsulated Data are a point of order q in E(F_p) and an integer in the range 0 to (2^n) - 1. They are formatted as described in Section 4. 2.3. Parameters to Be Defined or Negotiated In order for an application to make use of the SAKKE algorithm, the communicating hosts MUST agree on values for several of the parameters described above. The curve equation (E) and the pairing (< , >) are constant and used for all applications. For the following parameters, each application MUST either define an application-specific constant value or define a mechanism for hosts to negotiate a value: * n * p * q * P = (P_x,P_y) * g =

* Hash
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RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
3. Elliptic Curves and Pairings
E is a supersingular elliptic curve (of j-invariant 1728). E(F_p)
contains a cyclic subgroup of order q, denoted E(F_p)[q], whereas the
larger object E(F_p^2) contains the direct product of two cyclic
subgroups of order q, denoted E(F_p^2)[q].
P is a generator of E(F_p)[q]. It is specified by the (affine)
coordinates (P_x,P_y) in F_p, satisfying the curve equation.
Routines for point addition and doubling on E(F_p) can be found in
Appendix A.10 of [P1363].
3.1. E(F_p^2) and the Distortion Map
If (Q_x,Q_y) are (affine) coordinates in F_p for some point (denoted
Q) on E(F_p)[q], then (-Q_x,iQ_y) are (affine) coordinates in F_p^2
for some point on E(F_p^2)[q]. This latter point is denoted [i]Q, by
analogy with the definition for scalar multiplication. The two
points P and [i]P together generate E(F_p^2)[q]. The map [i]: E(F_p)
-> E(F_p^2) is sometimes termed the distortion map.
3.2. The Tate-Lichtenbaum Pairing
We proceed to describe the pairing < , > to be used in SAKKE. We
will need to evaluate polynomials f_R that depend on points on
E(F_p)[q]. Miller's algorithm [Miller] provides a method for
evaluation of f_R(X), where X is some element of E(F_p^2)[q] and R is
some element of E(F_p)[q] and f_R is some polynomial over F_p whose
divisor is (q)(R) - (q)(0). Note that f_R is defined only up to
scalars of F_p.
The version of the Tate-Lichtenbaum pairing used in this document is
given by ```
/*
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as
authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in
Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to
IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
*/
Routine for computing the pairing
```

```
4. Representation of Values
This section provides canonical representations of values that MUST
be used to ensure interoperability of implementations. The following
representations MUST be used for input into hash functions and for
transmission.
Integers Integers MUST be represented as an octet string,
with bit length a multiple of 8. To achieve this,
the integer is represented most significant bit
first, and padded with zero bits on the left until
an octet string of the necessary length is
obtained. This is the octet string representation
described in Section 6 of [RFC6090].
F_p elements Elements of F_p MUST be represented as integers in
the range 0 to p-1 using the octet string
representation defined above. Such octet strings
MUST have length L = Ceiling(lg(p)/8).
PF_p elements Elements of PF_p MUST be represented as an element
of F_p using the algorithm in Section 3.2. They
are therefore represented as octet strings as
defined above and are L octets in length.
Representation of the unique element of order 2 in
PF_p will not be required.
Points on E Elliptic curve points MUST be represented in
uncompressed form as defined in Section 2.2 of
[RFC5480]. For an elliptic curve point (x,y) with
x and y in F_p, this representation is given by
Groves Informational [Page 9]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
0x04 || x' || y', where x' is the octet string
representing x, y' is the octet string
representing y, and || denotes concatenation. The
representation is 2*L+1 octets in length.
Encapsulated Data The Encapsulated Data MUST be represented as an
elliptic curve point concatenated with an integer
in the range 0 to (2 ^ n) - 1. Since the length
of the representation of elements of F_p is well
defined given p, these data can be unambiguously
parsed to retrieve their components. The
Encapsulated Data is 2*L + n + 1 octets in length.
5. Supporting Algorithms
5.1. Hashing to an Integer Range
We use the function HashToIntegerRange( s, n, hashfn ) to hash
strings to an integer range. Given a string (s), a hash function
(hashfn), and an integer (n), this function returns a value between 0
and n - 1.
Input:
* an octet string, s
* an integer, n <= (2^hashlen)^hashlen
* a hash function, hashfn, with output length hashlen bits
Output:
* an integer, v, in the range 0 to n-1
Method:
1) Let A = hashfn( s )
2) Let h_0 = 00...00, a string of null bits of length hashlen bits
3) Let l = Ceiling(lg(n)/hashlen)
4) For each i in 1 to l, do:
a) Let h_i = hashfn(h_(i - 1))
b) Let v_i = hashfn(h_i || A), where || denotes concatenation
Groves Informational [Page 10]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
5) Let v' = v_1 || ... || v_l
6) Let v = v' mod n
6. The SAKKE Cryptosystem
This section describes the Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption algorithm.
It draws from the cryptosystem first described in [S-K].
6.1. Setup
All users share a set of public parameters with a KMS. In most
circumstances, it is expected that a system will only use a single
KMS. However, it is possible for users provisioned by different KMSs
to interoperate, provided that they use a common set of public
parameters and that they each possess the necessary KMS Public Keys.
In order to facilitate this interoperation, it is anticipated that
parameters will be published in application-specific standards.
KMS_T chooses its KMS Master Secret, z_T. It MUST randomly select a
value in the range 2 to q-1, and assigns this value to z_T. It MUST
derive its KMS Public Key, Z_T, by performing the calculation Z_T =
[z_T]P.
6.1.1. Secret Key Extraction
The KMS derives each RSK from an Identifier and its KMS Master
Secret. It MUST derive a RSK for each user that it provisions.
For Identifier 'a', the RSK K_(a,T) provided by KMS_T MUST be derived
by KMS_T as K_(a,T) = [(a + z_T)^-1]P, where 'a' is interpreted as an
integer, and the inversion is performed modulo q.
6.1.2. User Provisioning
The KMS MUST provide its KMS Public Key to all users through an
authenticated channel. RSKs MUST be supplied to all users through a
channel that provides confidentiality and mutual authentication. The
mechanisms that provide security for these channels are beyond the
scope of this document: they are application specific.
Upon receipt of key material, each user MUST verify its RSK. For
Identifier 'a', RSKs from KMS_T are verified by checking that the
following equation holds: < [a]P + Z, K_(a,T) > = g, where 'a' is
interpreted as an integer.
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6.2. Key Exchange
A Sender forms Encapsulated Data and sends it to the Receiver, who
processes it. The result is a shared secret that can be used as
keying material for securing further communications. We denote the
Sender A with Identifier 'a'; we denote the Receiver B with
Identifier 'b'; Identifiers are to be interpreted as integers in the
algorithms below. Let A be provisioned by KMS_T and B be provisioned
by KMS_S.
6.2.1. Sender
In order to form Encapsulated Data to send to device B who is
provisioned by KMS_S, A needs to hold Z_S. It is anticipated that
this will have been provided to A by KMS_T along with its User
Private Keys. The Sender MUST carry out the following steps:
1) Select a random ephemeral integer value for the SSV in the
range 0 to 2^n - 1;
2) Compute r = HashToIntegerRange( SSV || b, q, Hash );
3) Compute R_(b,S) = [r]([b]P + Z_S) in E(F_p);
4) Compute the Hint, H;
a) Compute g^r. Note that g is an element of PF_p[q]
represented by an element of F_p. Thus, in order to
calculate g^r, the operation defined in Section 2.1 for
calculation of A * B in PF_p[q] is to be used as part of a
square and multiply (or similar) exponentiation algorithm,
rather than the regular F_p operations;
b) Compute H := SSV XOR HashToIntegerRange( g^r, 2^n, Hash );
5) Form the Encapsulated Data ( R_(b,S), H ), and transmit it
to B;
6) Output SSV for use to derive key material for the application
to be keyed.
6.2.2. Receiver
Device B receives Encapsulated Data from device A. In order to
process this, it requires its RSK, K_(b,S), which will have been
provisioned in advance by KMS_S. The method by which keys are
provisioned by the KMS is application specific. The Receiver MUST
carry out the following steps to derive and verify the SSV:
Groves Informational [Page 12]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
1) Parse the Encapsulated Data ( R_(b,S), H ), and extract R_(b,S)
and H;
2) Compute w := < R_(b,S), K_(b,S) >. Note that by bilinearity,
w = g^r;
3) Compute SSV = H XOR HashToIntegerRange( w, 2^n, Hash );
4) Compute r = HashToIntegerRange( SSV || b, q, Hash );
5) Compute TEST = [r]([b]P + Z_S) in E(F_p). If TEST does not
equal R_(b,S), then B MUST NOT use the SSV to derive key
material;
6) Output SSV for use to derive key material for the application
to be keyed.
6.3. Group Communications
The SAKKE scheme can be used to exchange SSVs for group
communications. To provide a shared secret to multiple Receivers, a
Sender MUST form Encapsulated Data for each of their Identifiers and
transmit the appropriate data to each Receiver. Any party possessing
the group SSV MAY extend the group by forming Encapsulated Data for a
new group member.
While the Sender needs to form multiple Encapsulated Data, the fact
that the sending operation avoids pairings means that the extension
to multiple Receivers can be carried out more efficiently than for
alternative IBE schemes that require the Sender to compute a pairing.
7. Security Considerations
This document describes the SAKKE cryptographic algorithm. We assume
that the security provided by this algorithm depends entirely on the
secrecy of the secret keys it uses, and that for an adversary to
defeat this security, he will need to perform computationally
intensive cryptanalytic attacks to recover a secret key. Note that a
security proof exists for SAKKE in the Random Oracle Model [SK-KEM].
When defining public parameters, guidance on parameter sizes from
[SP800-57] SHOULD be followed. Note that the size of the F_p^2
discrete logarithm on which the security rests is 2*lg(p). Table 1
shows bits of security afforded by various sizes of p. If k bits of
security are needed, then lg(q) SHOULD be chosen to be at least 2*k.
Similarly, if k bits of security are needed, then a hash with output
size at least 2*k SHOULD be chosen.
Groves Informational [Page 13]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
Bits of Security | lg(p)
-------------------------
80 | 512
112 | 1024
128 | 1536
192 | 3840
256 | 7680
Table 1: Comparable Strengths, Taken from Table 2 of [SP800-57]
The KMS Master Secret provides the security for each device
provisioned by the KMS. It MUST NOT be revealed to any other entity.
Each user's RSK protects the SAKKE communications it receives. This
key MUST NOT be revealed to any entity other than the trusted KMS and
the authorized user.
In order to ensure that the RSK is received only by an authorized
device, it MUST be provided through a secure channel. The security
offered by this system is no greater than the security provided by
this delivery channel.
Note that IBE systems have different properties than other asymmetric
cryptographic schemes with regard to key recovery. The KMS (and
hence any administrator with appropriate privileges) can create RSKs
for arbitrary Identifiers, and procedures to monitor the creation of
RSKs, such as logging of administrator actions, SHOULD be defined by
any functioning implementation of SAKKE.
Identifiers MUST be defined unambiguously by each application of
SAKKE. Note that it is not necessary to hash the data in a format
for Identifiers (except in the case where its size would be greater
than that of q). In this way, any weaknesses that might be caused by
collisions in hash functions can be avoided without reliance on the
structure of the Identifier format. Applications of SAKKE MAY
include a time/date component in their Identifier format to ensure
that Identifiers (and hence RSKs) are only valid for a fixed period
of time.
The randomness of values stipulated to be selected at random in
SAKKE, as described in this document, is essential to the security
provided by SAKKE. If the ephemeral value r selected by the Sender
is not chosen at random, then the SSV, which is used to provide key
material for further communications, could be predictable. Guidance
on the generation of random values for security can be found in
[RFC4086].
Groves Informational [Page 14]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5480] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
Information", RFC 5480, March 2009.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental
Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
February 2011.
[S-K] Sakai, R., Ohgishi, K., and M. Kasahara, "ID based
cryptosystem based on pairing on elliptic curves",
Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security -
SCIS, 2001.
[SK-KEM] Barbosa, M., Chen, L., Cheng, Z., Chimley, M., Dent, A.,
Farshim, P., Harrison, K., Malone-Lee, J., Smart, N., and
F. Vercauteren, "SK-KEM: An Identity-Based KEM",
submission for IEEE P1363.3, June 2006,
(http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/IBC/
submissions/Barbosa-SK-KEM-2006-06.pdf).
[SP800-57] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
"Recommendation for Key Management - Part 1: General
(Revised)", NIST Special Publication 800-57, March 2007.
8.2. Informative References
[Barreto] Barreto, P., Kim, H., Lynn, B., and M. Scott, "Efficient
Algorithms for Pairing-Based Cryptosystems", Advances in
Cryptology - Crypto 2002, LNCS 2442, Springer-Verlag
(2002), pp. 354-369.
[Miller] Miller, V., "The Weil pairing, and its efficient
calculation", J. Cryptology 17 (2004), 235-261.
[P1363] IEEE P1363-2000, "Standard Specifications for Public-Key
Cryptography", 2001.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106,
RFC 4086, June 2005.
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RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
[RFC5091] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography
Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations
of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", RFC 5091,
December 2007.
[RFC6509] Groves, M., "MIKEY-SAKKE: Sakai-Kasahara Key Encryption
in Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)", RFC 6509,
February 2012.
Groves Informational [Page 16]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
Appendix A. Test Data
This appendix provides test data for SAKKE with the public parameters
defined in Appendix A of [RFC6509]. 'b' represents the Identifier of
the Responder. The value "mask" is the value used to mask the SSV
and is defined to be
HashToIntegerRange( g^r, 2^n, Hash ).
// --------------------------------------------------------
// The KMS generates:
z = AFF429D3 5F84B110 D094803B 3595A6E2 998BC99F
Zx = 5958EF1B 1679BF09 9B3A030D F255AA6A
23C1D8F1 43D4D23F 753E69BD 27A832F3
8CB4AD53 DDEF4260 B0FE8BB4 5C4C1FF5
10EFFE30 0367A37B 61F701D9 14AEF097
24825FA0 707D61A6 DFF4FBD7 273566CD
DE352A0B 04B7C16A 78309BE6 40697DE7
47613A5F C195E8B9 F328852A 579DB8F9
9B1D0034 479EA9C5 595F47C4 B2F54FF2
Zy = 1508D375 14DCF7A8 E143A605 8C09A6BF
2C9858CA 37C25806 5AE6BF75 32BC8B5B
63383866 E0753C5A C0E72709 F8445F2E
6178E065 857E0EDA 10F68206 B63505ED
87E534FB 2831FF95 7FB7DC61 9DAE6130
1EEACC2F DA3680EA 4999258A 833CEA8F
C67C6D19 487FB449 059F26CC 8AAB655A
B58B7CC7 96E24E9A 39409575 4F5F8BAE
// --------------------------------------------------------
// Creating Encapsulated Data
b = 3230 31312D30 32007465 6C3A2B34
34373730 30393030 31323300
SSV = 12345678 9ABCDEF0 12345678 9ABCDEF0
Groves Informational [Page 17]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
r = HashToIntegerRange(
12345678 9ABCDEF0 12345678 9ABCDEF0
32303131 2D303200 74656C3A 2B343437
37303039 30303132 3300, q, SHA-256 )
= 13EE3E1B 8DAC5DB1 68B1CEB3 2F0566A4
C273693F 78BAFFA2 A2EE6A68 6E6BD90F
8206CCAB 84E7F42E D39BD4FB 131012EC
CA2ECD21 19414560 C17CAB46 B956A80F
58A3302E B3E2C9A2 28FBA7ED 34D8ACA2
392DA1FF B0B17B23 20AE09AA EDFD0235
F6FE0EB6 5337A63F 9CC97728 B8E5AD04
60FADE14 4369AA5B 21662132 47712096
Rbx = 44E8AD44 AB8592A6 A5A3DDCA 5CF896C7
18043606 A01D650D EF37A01F 37C228C3
32FC3173 54E2C274 D4DAF8AD 001054C7
6CE57971 C6F4486D 57230432 61C506EB
F5BE438F 53DE04F0 67C776E0 DD3B71A6
29013328 3725A532 F21AF145 126DC1D7
77ECC27B E50835BD 28098B8A 73D9F801
D893793A 41FF5C49 B87E79F2 BE4D56CE
Rby = 557E134A D85BB1D4 B9CE4F8B E4B08A12
BABF55B1 D6F1D7A6 38019EA2 8E15AB1C
9F76375F DD1210D4 F4351B9A 009486B7
F3ED46C9 65DED2D8 0DADE4F3 8C6721D5
2C3AD103 A10EBD29 59248B4E F006836B
F097448E 6107C9ED EE9FB704 823DF199
F832C905 AE45F8A2 47A072D8 EF729EAB
C5E27574 B07739B3 4BE74A53 2F747B86
g^r = 7D2A8438 E6291C64 9B6579EB 3B79EAE9
48B1DE9E 5F7D1F40 70A08F8D B6B3C515
6F2201AF FBB5CB9D 82AA3EC0 D0398B89
ABC78A13 A760C0BF 3F77E63D 0DF3F1A3
41A41B88 11DF197F D6CD0F00 3125606F
4F109F40 0F7292A1 0D255E3C 0EBCCB42
53FB182C 68F09CF6 CD9C4A53 DA6C74AD
007AF36B 8BCA979D 5895E282 F483FCD6
Groves Informational [Page 18]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
mask = HashToIntegerRange(
7D2A8438 E6291C64 9B6579EB 3B79EAE9
48B1DE9E 5F7D1F40 70A08F8D B6B3C515
6F2201AF FBB5CB9D 82AA3EC0 D0398B89
ABC78A13 A760C0BF 3F77E63D 0DF3F1A3
41A41B88 11DF197F D6CD0F00 3125606F
4F109F40 0F7292A1 0D255E3C 0EBCCB42
53FB182C 68F09CF6 CD9C4A53 DA6C74AD
007AF36B 8BCA979D 5895E282 F483FCD6, 2^128, SHA-256 )
= 9BD4EA1E 801D37E6 2AD2FAB0 D4F5BBF7
H = 89E0BC66 1AA1E916 38E6ACC8 4E496507
// --------------------------------------------------------
// Receiver processing
// Device receives Kb from the KMS
Kbx = 93AF67E5 007BA6E6 A80DA793 DA300FA4
B52D0A74 E25E6E7B 2B3D6EE9 D18A9B5C
5023597B D82D8062 D3401956 3BA1D25C
0DC56B7B 979D74AA 50F29FBF 11CC2C93
F5DFCA61 5E609279 F6175CEA DB00B58C
6BEE1E7A 2A47C4F0 C456F052 59A6FA94
A634A40D AE1DF593 D4FECF68 8D5FC678
BE7EFC6D F3D68353 25B83B2C 6E69036B
Kby = 155F0A27 241094B0 4BFB0BDF AC6C670A
65C325D3 9A069F03 659D44CA 27D3BE8D
F311172B 55416018 1CBE94A2 A783320C
ED590BC4 2644702C F371271E 496BF20F
588B78A1 BC01ECBB 6559934B DD2FB65D
2884318A 33D1A42A DF5E33CC 5800280B
28356497 F87135BA B9612A17 26042440
9AC15FEE 996B744C 33215123 5DECB0F5
// Device processes Encapsulated Data
w = 7D2A8438 E6291C64 9B6579EB 3B79EAE9
48B1DE9E 5F7D1F40 70A08F8D B6B3C515
6F2201AF FBB5CB9D 82AA3EC0 D0398B89
ABC78A13 A760C0BF 3F77E63D 0DF3F1A3
41A41B88 11DF197F D6CD0F00 3125606F
4F109F40 0F7292A1 0D255E3C 0EBCCB42
53FB182C 68F09CF6 CD9C4A53 DA6C74AD
007AF36B 8BCA979D 5895E282 F483FCD6
Groves Informational [Page 19]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
SSV = 12345678 9ABCDEF0 12345678 9ABCDEF0
r = 13EE3E1B 8DAC5DB1 68B1CEB3 2F0566A4
C273693F 78BAFFA2 A2EE6A68 6E6BD90F
8206CCAB 84E7F42E D39BD4FB 131012EC
CA2ECD21 19414560 C17CAB46 B956A80F
58A3302E B3E2C9A2 28FBA7ED 34D8ACA2
392DA1FF B0B17B23 20AE09AA EDFD0235
F6FE0EB6 5337A63F 9CC97728 B8E5AD04
60FADE14 4369AA5B 21662132 47712096
TESTx = 44E8AD44 AB8592A6 A5A3DDCA 5CF896C7
18043606 A01D650D EF37A01F 37C228C3
32FC3173 54E2C274 D4DAF8AD 001054C7
6CE57971 C6F4486D 57230432 61C506EB
F5BE438F 53DE04F0 67C776E0 DD3B71A6
29013328 3725A532 F21AF145 126DC1D7
77ECC27B E50835BD 28098B8A 73D9F801
D893793A 41FF5C49 B87E79F2 BE4D56CE
TESTy = 557E134A D85BB1D4 B9CE4F8B E4B08A12
BABF55B1 D6F1D7A6 38019EA2 8E15AB1C
9F76375F DD1210D4 F4351B9A 009486B7
F3ED46C9 65DED2D8 0DADE4F3 8C6721D5
2C3AD103 A10EBD29 59248B4E F006836B
F097448E 6107C9ED EE9FB704 823DF199
F832C905 AE45F8A2 47A072D8 EF729EAB
C5E27574 B07739B3 4BE74A53 2F747B86
TEST == Rb
// --------------------------------------------------------
// HashToIntegerRange( M, q, SHA-256 ) example
M = 12345678 9ABCDEF0 12345678 9ABCDEF0
32303131 2D303200 74656C3A 2B343437
37303039 30303132 3300
A = E04D4EF6 9DF86893 22B39AE3 80284617
4A93BEDB 1E3D2A2C 5F2C7EA0 05513EBA
h0 = 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
h1 = 66687AAD F862BD77 6C8FC18B 8E9F8E20
08971485 6EE233B3 902A591D 0D5F2925
Groves Informational [Page 20]
RFC 6508 SAKKE February 2012
h2 = 2B32DB6C 2C0A6235 FB1397E8 225EA85E
0F0E6E8C 7B126D00 16CCBDE0 E667151E
h3 = 12771355 E46CD47C 71ED1721 FD5319B3
83CCA3A1 F9FCE3AA 1C8CD3BD 37AF20D7
h4 = FE15C0D3 EBE314FA D720A08B 839A004C
2E6386F5 AECC19EC 74807D19 20CB6AEB
v1 = FA2656CA 1D2DBD79 015AE918 773DFEDC
24957C91 E3C9C335 40D6BF6D 7C3C0055
v2 = F016CD67 59620AD7 87669E3A DD887DF6
25895A91 0CEE1486 91A06735 B2F0A248
v3 = AC45C6F9 7F83BCE0 A2BBD0A1 4CF4D7F4
CB3590FB FAF93AE7 1C64E426 185710B5
v4 = E65D50BD 551A54EF 981F535E 072DE98D
2223ACAD 4621E026 3B0A61EA C56DB078
v mod q = 13EE3E1B 8DAC5DB1 68B1CEB3 2F0566A4
C273693F 78BAFFA2 A2EE6A68 6E6BD90F
8206CCAB 84E7F42E D39BD4FB 131012EC
CA2ECD21 19414560 C17CAB46 B956A80F
58A3302E B3E2C9A2 28FBA7ED 34D8ACA2
392DA1FF B0B17B23 20AE09AA EDFD0235
F6FE0EB6 5337A63F 9CC97728 B8E5AD04
60FADE14 4369AA5B 21662132 47712096
// --------------------------------------------------------
Author's Address
Michael Groves
CESG
Hubble Road
Cheltenham
GL51 8HJ
UK
EMail: Michael.Groves@cesg.gsi.gov.uk
Groves Informational [Page 21]
```